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S.ALEs-UNIFoRM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT-STRICT REQUIREMENT OF AcDESIGNATING TRUSTEE IN FILING UNDER THE ACT-Plaintiff and
E. R. Millen Co., Inc., entered into a financing arrangement whereby plaintiff
agreed to finance the wholesale purchase of various types of electrical appliances
by E. R. Millen Co., Inc. Plaintiff promptly recorded a statement of trust
receipt financing setting forth that the plaintiff "is or expects to be engaged
in financing under trust receipt transactions the acquisitions by the trustee,
E. R. Millen Company." The statement then designated the trustee's business
address. This trust receipts arrangement was in operation for about a year
when E. R. Millen Co., Inc., made a general assignment of all of its property
to the defendant for the benefit of its creditors. Plaintiff brought suit to obtain
a declaratory decree as to its security interest in the electrical equipment turned
over to defendant. The trial court ruled that the statement filed by the plaintiff
did not comply with the recording provisions of the Uniform Trust Receipts
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Act because the trustee's name was given as "E. R. Millen Company,'' instead
of "E. R. Millen Co., Inc." Consequently, the plaintiff's security interest was
void as against the defendant.1 On appeal, held, affirmed. As a uniform law,
the Trust Receipts Act should be strictly construed if the decisions in the several
states are to be uniform, and exact compliance with the recording provisions
is accordingly required in order to impart constructive notice to third parties. 2
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Haley, (Mass. 1952) 109 N. E. (2d) 143.
The principal case is believed to be the first that has dealt with the question
of the degree of accuracy needed in designating the trustee's name in order to
comply with the recording requirements of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.
However, a somewhat analogous problem has frequently been presented by
cases involving the adequacy of the description of personal property in the
recordations of conditional sale contracts and chattel mortgages. 3 In general,
the decisions in these cases reflect a less stringent attitude with respect to the
need for accuracy and completeness than is represented by the decision
in the principal case. While many cases ·can be found where a description
has been held defective because it is either inaccurate4 or incomplete,5 there
are also numerous cases which have upheld descriptions that are inaccurate in
some respect6 or are to a considerable extent incomplete.7 For the most part
1 The critical statutory provisions read as follows: "If the entruster within the period
of thirty days specified in subsection 1 of section eight files as in this chapter provided, such
filing shall be effective to preserve his security interest in documents or goods against all
persons, save as otherwise provided by sections eight to eleven, inclusive, fourteen and
fifteen." Mass. Laws Ann. (1952 Supp.) c. 255A, §7. "Any entruster undertaking or
contemplating trust receipt transactions with reference to documents of goods • • • may file
with the state secretary a statement, signed by the entruster and the trustee, containing:
(a) A designation of the entruster and the trustee, and of the chief place of business of
each.•••" Mass. Laws Ann. (1952 Supp.) c. 255A, §13.
_
2 With the adoption of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act by Michigan in 1952, Mich.
Comp. Laws (Mason, 1952 Supp.) §§555.401 to 555.419, the act is now in force in
twenty-eight states. The other states that have adopted the act are Alabama, Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, lliinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and Wyoming.
3 Cases collected in 65 A.L.R. 714 (1930). A related problem is also presented where
the applicable statute requires the inclusion of all conditions or terms of the conditional
sale contract in the recording instrument. Some of the cases indicate that the statute will
be strictly construed and applied with respect to questions of accuracy and completeness.
See Standard Acceptance Corp. v. Connor, 127 Conn. 199, 15 A. (2d) 314 (1940);
Rhode Island Hospital National Bank v. Larson, 137 Conn. 541, 79 A. (2d) 182 (1951);
Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Thomas, (2d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 892.
4 Shearer v. Rousch, 32 Ga. App. 663, 124 S.E. 356 (1924); Trapani v. Universal
Credit Co., 151 Kan. 715, 100 P. (2d) 735 (1940).
5 A. Y. McDonald Mfg. Co. v. Read, 210 Minn. 232, 297 N.W. 739 (1941); International Harvester Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 153 Kan. 414, 110 P. (2d) 779 (1941);
Empire State Chair Co. v. Beldock, (2d Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 587.
6 G. A. Crancer Co. v. Cooper, 98 Neb. 153, 152 N.W. 304 (1914); MacCallumDonahoe Finance Co. v. Warren, 122 Wash. 176, 210 P. 368 (1922); Huber v. Cloud,
102 N.J. 181, 130 A. 562 (1925); C.I.T. Corp. v. DeGraff Lumber Co., 194 Minn. 169,
259 N.W. 807 (1935).
7 Gould v. Huff, 130 Me. 226, 154 A. 574 (1931); In re Central Park Dairyland,
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these cases are reconcilable and taken together support the frequently stated
proposition that a description is satisfactory if it will enable a third person to
identify the property from an inspection of the public records and such reasonable inquiry as the recording instrument itself suggests.8 It has been said that
the reason for this rule rests in the frequently inherent difficulty of adequatelydescribing personal property.9 If this explanation is correct, it is not surprising
that a more stringent rule should prevail in the trust receipts situation. There
could hardly be any unusual difficulty in accurately and adequately designating
the name of the trustee. However, the fact that the reason for the lenient rule
in the chattel mortgage and conditional sale cases is not applicable to the trust
receipts case does not necessitate the adoption of a rule that one hundred
percent accuracy should be required in the latter situation. Undoubtedly the
decision in the principal case was prompted in part by the difficulty of formulating a clear and meaningful standard for separating inaccuracies which would
actually be insignificant from those that might reasonably mislead third parties.
By the position taken in the principal case, the Massachusetts court has established a rule which achieves a high degree of certainty in application. Uniformity of decision in the several states is, of course, aided by a fixed and certain
rule. However, the question remains whether the court in the principal case
did not pay too high a price in terms of a common sense result for the certainty
which the decision achieves.10 In any event, the decision sounds a sharp
warning with respect to the care that should be taken in filing under the Trust
Receipts Act.11
John W. Hupp, S.Ed.

37 N.Y.S. (2d) 270 (1942); Genger v. Albers, 90 Cal. App. (2d) 52, 202 P. (2d) 569
(1949).
s G. A. Crancer Co. v. Cooper, note 6 supra; Gould v. Huff, note 7 supra; A. Y.
McDonald Mfg. Co. v. Read, note 5 supra; International Harvester Co. v. Champlin
Refining Co., note 5 supra.
9 65 A.L.R. 714 at 718 (1930); In re Brownsville Brewing Co., (3d Cir. 1941) 117
F. (2d) 463 at 466.
10 The following comment has been made in answer to the contention that the Uniform Conditional Sales Act should be subjected to a highly technical construction: "While,
of course, as appellee contends, the statute must be strictly construed, it must also be construed with common sense." York Ice Machinery Corp. v. Kearney, 344 Pa. 659 at 662,
25 A. (2d) 179 (1942).
11 For a general discussion of the problem of recording under the Trust Receipts Act,
see Carter, ''The Trust Receipt and the Problem of Recordation or Notice Filing," 1951
WAsH. Umv. L.Q. 30 (1951).

